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A PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE JUDICIAL
HUNCH
Mark C. Modak-Truran*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges currently face a daunting task. On the one hand, they
are increasingly aware of the indeterminacy of the law, while on
the other hand, they face an explosion of fact. Judges are floating
on shaky legal timbers in a sea of documents, deposition tran-
scripts, affidavits, oral courtroom testimony, and expert opinions.
The explosion of fact alone presents monumental problems for de-
ciding cases without unduly simplifying or reducing this factual
complexity. For example, both federal and state judges are im-
plementing case management systems to deal with their crushing
case loads and the increasing complexity of their cases. In addi-
tion, there appears to be an overwhelming consensus that the law
is indeterminate, but there is little consensus as to what that
means.' For instance, extreme-radical deconstructionists such as
Anthony D'Amato have argued that even the constitutional re-
quirement that the President be thirty-five years of age is inde-
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olphus College; J.D., Northwestern University; A-M., Ph.D. Candidate, University of Chi-
cago. I would like to thank David E. Van Zandt and Matthew S. Steffey for helpful com-
ments on this article. I also want to thank Mississippi College for supporting my work on
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1. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 201 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). Ken
Kress notes that
versions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the
court has complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the
plaintiff who brings suit to quiet title to his cabin and surrounding property
in the Rocky Mountains) or rather has a limited choice among a few options
(hold for defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of monetary damages
or other remedies), or some position in between.
Id.
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terminate.2 Furthermore, even contemporary legal formalists,
such as Ernest Weinrib, claim that "[n]othing about formalism
precludes indeterminacy.
3
How are judges to deal with this factual explosion in an uncer-
tain legal world? With the advent of legal indeterminacy, most
theorists have given up on the aspirations of strong legal formal-
ism that judging can become a science where judges, like techni-
cians, determine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic.4
Although giving up on strong legal formalism, some still maintain
that judging is a matter of technical reasoning. Judicial reasoning
has to do with reasoning correctly either about the applicable le-
gal rules or principles or about how the decision achieves an aim
or end such as economic efficiency.5 Still others argue that judi-
cial decision making is not circumscribed by reason, but is an as-
sertion of political power. To explain judicial decision making,
they claim that we must deconstruct judges' reasoning to deter-
2. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged
President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250, 252-53 (1989). D'Amato notes that "deconstructionists
say that all interpretation depends on context. Radical deconstructionists add that, be-
cause contexts can change, there can be no such thing as a single interpretation of any
text that is absolute and unchanging for all time." Id. at 252. See also Anthony D'Amato,
Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word "Bird," 84 NW. U. L. REV. 536, 536
(1990) (viewing Frederick Schauer's doctrinal statements about birds and pelicans from
the standpoint of a deconstructionist); Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 148, 149 (1990) (replying to criticism from formalistic scholars on his de-
constructionist view of Pragmatic Indeterminancy).
3. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 1008 (1988).
4. See A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (1967) (discussing Christopher
Columbus Langdell's claims that "law is a science" and that "'all the available materials of
that science are contained in printed books.'). For further discussion of the dominance of
Langdell and strong legal formalism from the Civil War to World War I, see GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977).
5. Ronald Dworkin argues that "UWudges who accept the interpretive ideal of integ-
rity decide hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people's
rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal
doctrine of their community." RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 255 (1986). Judge Richard
Posner also argues that legal reasoning is technical but maintains that it should emulate
the instrumental reasoning of economic analysis. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS
OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 208 (1999). Posner contends that "UWudges have got to un-
derstand that the only sound basis for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires
an economic judgment, balancing benefits against costs." Id. He further claims that
"[m]ost economic analysis of law is pragmatic" and that "'pragmatist judges always try to
do the best they can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any felt duty to se-
cure consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past.'" Id. at 239,
241. Posner's legal pragmatism, however, is not the same as philosophical pragmatism so
that it is entirely consistent with resorting to the technical reasoning employed by the
economic analysis of law. See id.
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mine what hidden presuppositions, such as race,6 gender,' or
class,' are guiding it.
By contrast, Judge Hutcheson's hunch theory of judicial deci-
sion making provides another way out of this quandary. Although
writing over seventy years ago, Hutcheson acknowledged legal
indeterminacy and the importance of judges as vital decision
makers in our society.9 He argued that law cannot be reduced to
logic and that judges are not technicians mechanically applying
the law. Nevertheless, Hutcheson does not embrace either the
idea that judicial decision making is a matter of technical rea-
soning or the idea that it can be reduced to politics. Rather,
Hutcheson argues for a pragmatic and empirical method of judg-
ing. He maintains that judges intuit or feel their way to their de-
cisions. Once the judge has considered all the available material,
the judge waits for the intuition or the hunch which leads to the
solution. The imagination lifts the judge's brooding mind above
the constricting, conflicting facts and precedent that impede the
just decision. The judge's mind is thereby exposed to the fullness
of experience which allows for a just resolution of the case.
6. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Sense, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (arguing that Critical Race Theorists have tried to show that
.areas of law ostensibly designed for our benefit often benefit whites even more than
blacks"). See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993) (tracing the history and themes surrounding
Critical Race Theory through a comprehensive bibliography of articles).
7. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988), re-
printed in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENcE 493 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) (claiming that mascu-
line jurisprudence proceeds from the presupposition of individuals as essentially separate
from one another ("separation thesis") while feminist jurisprudence proceeds from the pre-
supposition that individuals are essentially connected or related to one another). See gen-
erally FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)
(providing a compilation of essays examining feminist legal theory and feminist jurispru-
dence).
8. See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563,
565 (1983) (arguing that the Critical Legal Studies Movement rejects the claims that law
and morality can be based on an apolitical method or procedure of justification and that
the legal system can be objectively defended as embodying an intelligible moral order).
Unger further suggests that the legal order is merely the outcome of power struggles or
practical compromises and thus advocates "the purely instrumental use of legal practice
and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims." Id. at 567. See also MARK KEIMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDiES 13 (1987) (characterizing CLS as maintaining "that the legal
system is invariably simultaneously philosophically committed to mirror-image contra-
dicting norms, each of which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter how 'easy'
the case first appears)" and "that settledjustificatory schemes are in fact unattainable").
9. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 275 (1929), reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 16 (1938) [hereinafter Judgment Intuitive].
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Hutcheson thus contends that judges should embrace factual
complexity and attempt to determine its legal significance with-
out arbitrarily reducing or containing it through the powers of
technical reason.
On the one hand, Hutcheson's account of judicial decision
making seems familiar and similar to the imprecise and indirect
way of making practical decisions that we experience in our eve-
ryday life. On the other hand, Hutcheson's use of terms such as
"hunch" and "intuition" suggest a certain crudeness and potential
arbitrariness that seems contrary to how we usually understand
what judges do.' ° Are judges just guessing? Can judges justify de-
cisions based on hunches? In other words, the idea that judges
should decide cases based on hunches must be given an adequate
epistemological justification. Otherwise, Hutcheson's hunch the-
ory of judicial decision making could be crassly characterized as
advocating the position that "law is only a matter of what the
judge had for breakfast."" Anything would be permitted.
This article argues that William James's pragmatism 2 pro-
vides a compelling epistemological justification for the hunch the-
ory of judicial decision making and saves the hunch from arbi-
trariness. 3 If this philosophical justification is successful, the
10. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 471
(1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986) (noting that
Kalman's characterization of legal realism suggests that "nothing prevents judges from
acting arbitrarily and oppressively")).
11. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 36 (claiming that this phrase summarizes some ac-
counts of legal realism).
12. The term pragmatism, especially in reference to a group of philosophers, can be
misleading. I will refer to James as a pragmatist because he is commonly referred to as
such. Sticking with convention will eliminate the need to justify the alternative classifica-
tion, process philosopher, which I would normally apply to James. Others have also re-
ferred to James as a process philosopher along with John Dewey and especially Alfred
North Whitehead. See WILLIAM DEAN, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS EMPIRICISM 83 (1986). In ad-
dition, legal pragmatism can take forms substantially different from philosophical prag-
matism. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5; Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as
Practice and Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 937 (1990) (presenting a pragmatist theory of
legal discourse). See generally Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1 (1996) (presenting a collection of eight essays defining and analyzing legal pragma-
tism).
13. Cf Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tra-
dition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541, 543 (1988).
Hantzis similarly argues for a pragmatic interpretation of Oliver Wendell Holmes's juris-
prudential thought. She argues that Holmes can best be understood as part of the wider
intellectual tradition of pragmatism, especially as espoused by Charles S. Peirce, rather
than as part of legal positivism. Id. at 544.
[Vol. 35:55
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hunch theory of judicial decision making presents a practical so-
lution to the explosion of fact and the indeterminacy of the law.
Judges will then be warranted in relying on their hunches to the
extent they meet the pragmatic conditions set forth by this justi-
fication. These pragmatic conditions do not provide a false sense
of legal certainty and judicial constraint like strong legal formal-
ism. Surprisingly, however, requiring that judges experience a
subjective sense of certainty about their decisions and that they
pragmatically test the consequences of their hunched decisions
provides a disciplining effect on judges indiscriminately relying
on idiosyncratic hunches.
In addition, this justification challenges the usual classification
of Hutcheson as a legal realist. 4 Some have argued that legal re-
alism has pragmatic origins, 5 but I will argue that James's
pragmatism is contrary to the central tenants of most legal real-
ists. Legal realists are usually characterized as "rule skeptics"
and argue that legal interpretation is not a science.' 6 However,
they embraced the scientific method and its narrow view of expe-
rience and attempted to reform the law by making it more ra-
tional and scientific." Once the deficiencies of conventional legal
14. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-26 (1930) (describing
Hutcheson's decision making process as judicial rationalization which is characteristic of
legal realism); W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOvEMENT 76 (2d ed.
1985) (showing Hutcheson within a chart displaying Karl Llewellyn's realists); Karl N.
Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUMI. L. REV. 581, 603-
04 (1940) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Newer Jurisprudence] (stating that the problem of find-
ing additional guidance was at the center of Hutcheson's writings); Karl N. Llewellyn,
Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1258
(1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism] (listing Hutcheson as a source reviewed by
Llewellyn to develop a test or definition of legal realism); G. Edward White, From Socio-
logical Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Twentieth Century
America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1972) (describing Hutcheson's judicial decisions as
"impressionistic or subjective" and as typical of legal realism) [hereinafter White, Socio-
logical Jurisprudence]. For further background information on the life of Judge Hutcheson
and an account of his views on the role of courts in our legal system, see Charles L. Zelden,
The Judge Intuitive: The Life and Judicial Philosophy of Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 39 S.
TEX. L. REV. 905 (1998).
15. See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 235 n.13 (1990) (arguing that legal realists relied in part on the
American pragmatism of John Dewey and Morris Cohen).
16. See Singer, supra note 10, at 503-04 (describing the general characteristics of be-
liefs held by legal realists).
17. Laura Kalman claims that one of the main facets of legal realism is its function-
alism or instrumentalism. Id. at 468. She also claims that legal realists understood legal
rules in terms of their social consequences through the help of the social sciences to "en-
able them to reform the legal system to achieve efficiency and social justice." Id. at 469.
2001]
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discourse were demonstrated, they maintained that scientific
analysis could provide a more adequate way of resolving legal
disputes. 8 By contrast, Hutcheson does not espouse the scientific
method or any other form of technical reasoning to assist judges
in deciding cases. Instead, he maintains that the judge must in-
tuit or hunch the just result from the fullness of experience. Thus,
unlike most legal realists, Hutcheson does not advocate that
judges conquer factual complexity by submitting legal questions
to scientific analysis.
My pragmatic justification for the hunch theory of judicial deci-
sion making will proceed in four steps. First, I will summarize
and analyze Hutcheson's hunch theory of judicial decision mak-
ing. Second, I will consider several epistemological justifications
for the hunch theory and argue for a pragmatic justification of it.
Third, I will argue that James's pragmatism further provides
pragmatic conditions that discipline idiosyncratic hunching. Fi-
nally, I will challenge Hutcheson's classification as a legal realist.
II. THE HUNCH THEORY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Originally, Judge Hutcheson was a strong legal formalist like
Christopher Columbus Langdell. 9 Hutcheson studied the law and
developed sections and compartments into which he arranged and
Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan argue that "[tihe [Legal] Realists were ideologi-
cally and practically wedded to the New Deal. Their underlying assumption could only
have been that issues of public policy merely raised technical questions of the best means
to achieve shared ends-questions that were amenable to the expertise of state staffers."
Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars:
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 204 (1984).
18. See Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1999).
19. Langdell may have agreed or disagreed with Hutcheson's description of judicial
decision making, but he would have argued that it ought to be different. Langdell made
the normative argument that legal decision making ought to entail a process of distilling
the finite body of fundamental legal doctrines from the cases. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4,
at 175. Langdell also argued that the number of legal doctrines discovered by the case
method was fewer than commonly supposed and that the common law cases could be re-
duced to a formal system. Id. at 174. By pigeonholing the case in the formal system, the
judge, like a technician, can determine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic.
See id. Hutcheson and the legal realists rejected Langdell's normative theory of judicial
decision making because their positive analysis indicated that judges made decisions in
other ways. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 279-80, reprinted in JOSEPH C.
HUTcHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 22-24 (1938). For example, Hutcheson claimed
that his experience indicated that judges intuit their decisions. Id. at 280, reprinted in
JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 24 (1938).
[Vol. 35:55
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re-arranged the facts of cases to fit the compartments. 2' He be-
lieved that the creation of law by judges had ceased. The law was
a definitive system of rules, precedents, categories, and concepts.
Judicial decision making was only a process of searching out the
proper rule, category, or concept and deducing the proper result.
Thus, judging was a matter of"logomancy."21
Judge Hutcheson's ideas about law and judicial decision mak-
ing, however, underwent a radical change. He became convinced
that technical definitions could lead to a deduction of conse-
quences unrelated to the name applied.22 Rules, he thought, must
be considered tentative because the many and varying facts can-
not be foreseen. He further became convinced that change, adap-
tation, and conformity were instincts in the nature of the law.
Law was a "thing of life."2 ' He now believed that the "power of the
brooding mind" created and changed jural relationships and that
judges were instruments of change in the law.24 In every case, he
maintained, judges use their intuitive faculties to create bridges
from the past to the new future.2 He even embraced Justice
20. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 274-75, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 15-16 (1938) (discussing the compartmentalization of law).
21. Id. at 274, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 15
(1938). In Judge Hutcheson's rationalistic period, he commented on four types of judg-
ments:
[F]irst the cogitative, of and by reflection and logomancy; second, aleatory, of
and by the dice; third, intuitive, of and by feeling or 'hunching;' and fourth,
asinine, of and by an ass. And in that same youthful, scornful way I regarded
the last three as only variants of each other, the results of processes all alien
to good judging.
Id. at 275-76, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUIIVE 14, 17 (1938).
22. See id. at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
17-18 (1938).
23. Id. at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 18
(1938).
24. Id. at 276-77, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
18 (1938). The full context of this quote will provide a fuller understanding of the radical
nature of Hutcheson's statements. Hutcheson stated that:
I came to see that instinct in the very nature of law itself is change, adapta-
tion, conformity, and that the instrument for all of this change, this adapta-
tion, this conformity, for the making and the nurturing of the law as a thing
of life, is the power of the brooding mind, which in its very brooding makes,
creates and changes jural relations, establishes philosophy, and drawing
away from the outworn past, here a little, there a little, line upon line, pre-
cept upon precept, safely and firmly, bridges for the judicial mind to pass the
abysses between that past and the new future.
Id.
25. In reference to this bridge building process, Hutcheson quotes Holmes's statement
2001]
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Holmes's famous claim that "'every opinion tends to become a
law.' 26
Judge Hutcheson's conversion to a view of law as changing and
fluid also included a change in his views of judicial decision
making. He argued that "the judge really decides by feeling, and
not by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination."27 Judge
Hutcheson described the faculty used for hunching or feeling as
imagination or intuition.21 Imagination is described as a "sensi-
tiveness to new ideas" which "when the track is cold" has the
power to cast "ever widening circles to find a fresh scent."29
Imagination enables poetic genius and scientific discovery. It is
the "power of expansion" or the "power of creation" that enters in
during the "simple brooding upon facts."" The creative process in
law is thus analogous to the creative process in art. The legal
precedents, principles, and analogies are necessary but only as a
springboard or as a medium for the imaginative leap to the just
result." He claims that intuition is "more subtle than any major
premise."3 2 It lifts "the mind above the mass of constricting mat-
ter whether of confused fact or precedent that stands in the way
of a just decision."" Judges listen to testimony and arguments
that "UWudges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially. They are con-
fined from Molar to molecular motions." Id. at 277 n.10, reprinted in JOSEPH C.
HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 18 n.10 (1938) (quoting Southern Pacific v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
26. Id. at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 18
(1938) (quoting Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).
27. Id. at 285, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 30
(1938).
28. Id. at 280, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 24
(1938). In Hutcheson's words, this faculty is described as:
Now, what is this faculty? What are its springs, what its uses? Many men
have spoken of it most beautifully. Some call it "intuition"-some, "imagina-
tion," this sensitiveness to new ideas, this power to range when the track is
cold, this power to cast in ever widening circles to find a fresh scent, instead
of standing baying where the track was lost.
Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 281, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 25
(1938).
31. See id. at 281, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
26 (1938) (describing the benefits of imagination).
32. Id. at 282, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 27
(1938).
33. Id. at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34
(1938).
[Vol. 35:55
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and study the law but must wait to feel one way or the other.
Judge Hutcheson describes his experience of the process as fol-
lows:
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and
duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over
the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch-that intuitive flash of un-
derstanding which makes the jump-spark connection between ques-
tion and decision, and at the point where the path is darkest for the
judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.3 4
In other words, the hunch or feeling performs a leading or con-
necting function between the past and the future; it provides the
necessary "jump-spark" to get from the question to the decision.
Despite the appeal of Hutcheson's description of judicial deci-
sion making, the hunch theory has several confusing aspects that
need clarification. One element of confusion is Hutcheson's use of
terms. He uses many terms interchangeably such as hunch, feel-
ing, intuition, faculty, and imagination. Nevertheless, he seems to
use these terms in three distinct ways. First, hunching and feel-
ing appear to refer to the whole process of decision making which
can be contrasted with rational decision making.35 Second, a
feeling, a hunch, and an intuition seem to signal the subjective
leading to or confirmation of a good or just decision.36 Finally, the
words faculty, faculty of feeling, intuition, and imagination seem
to refer to the human capacity for decision making." He even re-
fers to imagination as "the noblest attribute of man."8 These last
two categories will be the most important in determining the best
epistemological justification for the hunch theory.
A second source of confusion stems from Hutcheson's failure to
make clear whether the hunch leads to or confirms the decision,
34. Id. at 278, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 21
(1938). Robert Burns has recently tried to provide "an account of the felt certainty that
emerges in the course of the trial" which he also refers to as "an epiphany." ROBERT P.
BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 3 (1999). In this account, Burns cites this quote by
Hutcheson to establish that others have also claimed that nonformal intelligence informs
the manner in which judges and juries actually decide. Id. at 210.
35. See Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 277, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTUTrIvE 14, 19-20 (1938).
36. See id. at 278, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUrrIVE 14,
21 (1938).
37. See id. at 280, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
24-25 (1938).
38. Id.
20011
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or both. In many cases, the hunch seems to perform primarily a
leading function. Hutcheson adopts the Webster's International
Dictionary definition of a hunch as "'[a] strong, intuitive impres-
sion that something is about to happen.' 39 He also refers to the
hunch as the "jump-spark connection between question and deci-
sion"4" and the "triumphant precursor of the just judgment."4 In
other cases, however, the hunch additionally seems to signal the
conclusion of the process. He claims that "the decision is an intui-
tive sense of what is right or wrong for that cause." " For exam-
ple, he argues that the determination of whether something is a
novel invention warranting patent protection cannot be deter-
mined by any objective criteria. The judge must have the "same
imaginative response to an idea, something of that same flash of
genius that there is in the inventor.., that luminous quality of
the mind, that can give back, where there is invention, an an-
swering flash for flash."43 Furthermore, if the hunch does not also
refer to a confirmation of a correct decision, Hutcheson's hunch
theory would fail to explain how to determine whether the judge's
decision was a warranted one. Hutcheson does not talk about
validating the hunch or about any later stages of decision making
after the hunch. Hutcheson only refers to hunching out the just
decision which implies a vector quality to the hunch rather than a
preliminary step function. One reason for this interpretation is
Hutcheson's frequent, if not exclusive, use of the article the, as in
the hunch. Hutcheson's use of the hunch suggests that it is a sign
or indication that the decision makes sense even though the justi-
fication of the decision cannot be fully articulated or understood.
It is a sudden experience of how the whole fits together or what
decision makes sense. The post-hunch justification is a rationali-
zation of this process that cannot fully capture the fullness of this
experience. The judge works backward from the hunch or "'from a
39. Id. at 274 n.1, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTcHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
14 (1938). Similarly, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines hunch as a
"strong intuitive feeling concerning a future event or result." MERRIAM WEBSTERS
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 565 (10th ed. 1998).
40. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 278, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 21 (1938).
41. Id. at 287, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 33
(1938).
42. Id. at 285, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 30
(1938).
43. Id. at 284, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 28-
29 (1938).
[Vol. 35:55
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desirable conclusion back to one or another of a stock of logical
premises.""' Thus, the judicial hunch has a dual function of
leading to and confirming the proper judicial decision.
III. EPISTEMOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE HUNCH THEORY
Hutcheson's use of the terms hunch, feeling, intuition, faculty,
and imagination, however, imply many possible epistemological
justifications of the hunch theory of judicial decision making. This
section will explore three possible epistemological justifications of
the hunch theory: intuitionism, moral sense theory, and pragma-
tism. The first part of this section will explore and reject argu-
ments for an intuitionist or moral sense theory justification of the
hunch theory. The subsequent part will explore interpreting
Hutcheson as a pragmatist and argue that William James's the-
ory of pragmatism provides the best epistemological justification
for the hunch theory.
A. Intuitionism and Moral Sense Theory
To explore intuitionism as an epistemological justification of
the hunch theory, I will focus on the use of intuitive knowledge in
practical decision making in ethics as an analog to this process in
judicial decision making.45 There are two types of intuitionism."
One type claims that humans intuit or are directly aware of self-
evident first principles of conduct." From these first principles,
one must deduce the correct particular ethical judgment. This
process of practical reasoning is rationalistic and similar to
mathematics. Once self-evident first principles are established,
the process of reasoning becomes primarily deductive.
44 Id. at 287, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34
(1938) (quoting Max Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision, 2 A.B.A. J. 359 (1925)).
45. The use of an ethical form of intuitionism as an analog to judicial decision making
is not done to suggest that Hutcheson considered ethical and legal decisions to be the same
or similar. The reason that an ethical form of intuitionism will be helpful for analysis
stems from the fact that both ethics and law are forms of practical reasoning. In other
words, the metaethical description of the intuitive process of practical reasoning in ethics
should be very similar, if not identical, to the intuitive process of practical reasoning in
law. Also, in both cases, intuitionism provides an epistemological explanation of how we
obtain knowledge in order to make practical decisions.
46. See II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 128 (1967).
47. See, e.g., HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (Hackett ed., 1981) (1907)
(arguing that basic premises of utilitarianism are self-evident or grasped by intuition).
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Some evidence supporting an intuitionist interpretation of the
hunch theory can be seen in Hutcheson's claim that judges must
resort to "first principles" to find a solution." Also, he mentions
that judges' hunches must lead to the "abstract solution."49 De-
spite this evidence, Hutcheson rejects a rationalistic view of judi-
cial decision making. He refers to the process of judicial decision
making as creative and as a process of growth and change." In
the beginning of The Judgment Intuitive, he even describes and
explicitly rejects the deductive prototype of judicial decision
making suggested by this type of intuitionism.51 Thus, Hutcheson
seems to have at least implicitly rejected this deductive form of
intuitionism by his explicit rejection of deductive judicial decision
making.
The second type of intuitionism has some similarities to a
moral sense theory of ethics. In both of these theories, an ethical
decision maker becomes directly aware of the rightness or good-
ness of a particular action. Intuitionists claim that goodness is an
unanalyzable or indefinable quality which must simply be appre-
hended.52 Normative judgments are self-evident and can be
known only by intuition. Similarly, moral sense theorists claim
that we have a moral faculty, different from reason and similar to
one of the five senses, by which we sense the good or right course
of action. 3 In both of these cases, goodness or rightness refer to
objective goodness and rightness. This quality is apprehended or
perceived in the particular action to be taken and not just a sub-
jective feeling about that course of action itself. In other words,
the right or correct decision is found not made.
48. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 18 (1938) (quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Sugarland Indus., 296
F. 129, 138 (S.D. Tex. 1924)).
49. Id. at 286, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 32
(1938).
50. See id. at 275, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
15 (1938).
51. Id. at 274, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 14
(1938).
52. See, e.g., G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIAETHICA § 15 (rev. ed. 1993) (1903) (claiming good
is "a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought," which is like the color yellow in
that we know what it is if we have experienced it).
53. See, e.g., FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF
BEAUTY AND VIRTUE (1725) (Francis Hutcheson's quintessential definition of "moral
sense"). That Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. shared the same last name with Francis Hutcheson
is not any evidence that they shared similar philosophical ideas but that they shared a
Scottish ancestry. GEORGE F. BLACK, THE SURNAMES OF SCOTLAND: THEIR ORIGIN,
MEANING, AND HISTORY 371-72 (1979).
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Both the second type of intuitionism and moral sense theory
could provide an epistemological justification of the hunch theory.
Hutcheson's references to intuition and feeling could be implying
a theory of apprehending the goodness or rightness of particular
judicial decisions. Hutcheson also refers to the "faculty of feeling"
and the "intuitive faculty" which could be inferring a moral sense
theory of judicial decision making.54 Both of these theoretical ex-
planations are possible given Hutcheson's references to the hunch
as leading to the "just judgment," "the just solution," "the hidden
truth," and "justice."55 The use of these terms seems to imply that
there is some objectively true or correct judgment which is pas-
sively apprehended or perceived.
Conversely, Hutcheson's other comments contradict this inter-
pretation of decision making. As discussed above, Hutcheson
views judicial decision making as a process of subjective crea-
tion.56 The judge's brooding mind "makes, creates, and changes
jural relations."" Further, what is relevant to feeling the just de-
cision is not merely the facts of the case, as with intuitionism and
moral sense theory, but also includes the case law, statutes, and
"all the available material" at the judge's command.5" From this
material, the judge engages in an active and subjective process of
imagination to create a bridge between the past and the future.59
Consequently, judging is not a passive and objective process of
finding (apprehending or perceiving) the bridge already built. As
a result, Hutcheson's references to faculty of "feeling" and intui-
tion are best understood as active events of imagination rather
than passive events of perception or apprehension as in the sec-
ond type of intuitionism and moral sense theory.
54. See Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 283, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,28 (1938).
55. See id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 27-44.
57. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUiTV 14, 18 (1938).
58. Id. at 278, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 21
(1938).
59. See id. at 276-77, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUiTIVE
14, 18 (1938).
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B. Pragmatism
By contrast, pragmatism provides a better epistemological jus-
tification of the hunch theory. It is important to note that I am
not arguing that Hutcheson was a legal pragmatist but that his
hunch theory of judicial decision making can be philosophically
justified by a pragmatic epistemology. Thomas Grey has argued
that "pragmatism in legal theory can stand free of philosophical
pragmatism."" Richard Rorty has also noted that he agrees "with
Posner that judges will probably not find pragmatist philoso-
phers-either old or new-useful."6' In other words, my focus is
on providing a pragmatic philosophical justification of the hunch
theory but not on arguing that Hutcheson is a legal pragmatist.
In fact, the last section of this article could be read, in part, as an
argument against classifying Hutcheson as a legal pragmatist to
the extent legal realism can be classified as a form of legal prag-
matism.62 Accordingly, rather than focusing on whether Hutche-
son was a legal pragmatist, this section will briefly consider the
pragmatic philosophies of Charles S. Peirce and William James
60. Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 21
(1996). Grey argues that philosophical and legal pragmatism both embrace an antifounda-
tional account of inquiry as contextual and instrumental but that they mean different
things by this. Pragmatic philosophers emphasize that "human thought is constituted out
of a background of practices, cultural and individual, as well as being practical in the
sense of purposively directed to action." Id. at 22. Pragmatic philosophers criticized tradi-
tional philosophers for attempting to answer issues such as the nature of Being, Truth,
and Reality which they claim make no practical difference in how we act. Philosophical
pragmatism is instrumental, then, in the sense that it claims that ideas are meaningful
and true only if they have some practical implications for human activity. By contrast,
pragmatic jurisprudence is also contextual and instrumental but in different senses. For
example, judging is by nature a practical activity; it cannot dwell on theoretical issues that
fail to have practical implications. Consequently, pragmatic jurisprudence is instrumental
in a different sense in that it asks how the adjudication of legal disputes can serve human
purposes. In other words, Grey emphasizes that "[liegal pragmatism does not depend on
and can make no use of the pragmatist philosophers' critiques of metaphysics and episte-
mological foundationalism." Id. at 28.
61. Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1811, 1815 (1990). Michel Rosenfeld argues, however, that this does not mean
"that Posner, Rorty, and other pragmatists see no relationship between pragmatism in
philosophy and in law." Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpreta-
tion: Posner's and Rorty's Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDozo L.
REV. 97, 103 (1996). Rosenfeld argues instead that "pragmatist philosophy's antifounda-
tionalism has a liberating effect on law, by freeing the legal theorist from having to justify
practical solutions to legal problems under any comprehensive theory," and he specifies
three ways in which he thinks that this liberation can be understood. Id. at 104.
62. See infra Part V.
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as possible epistemological justifications for the hunch theory and
argue that James's theory provides the best justification.
1. Charles S. Peirce
Peirce has been considered the father of pragmatism. 63 His
epistemology begins with an analysis of what he claims is a con-
stant cycle of belief and doubt in human thought.' He argues
that inquiry and action occur because of this constant cycle of be-
lief and doubt. When we experience novelty, doubt arises because
our current propositional beliefs cannot provide a coherent expla-
nation of this novelty.65 This doubt then provokes us to investi-
gate in order to attain the state of belief by finding a set of propo-
sitions that can account for this novelty.6 6 Once we have
discerned these propositions, we can reenter the state of belief
which is a condition of readiness to act when the occasion arises.6 7
For example, in easy cases, the claims of the parties do not raise
novel issues, and the judge can resolve the dispute based on the
current legal norms. No state of doubt arises; the judge can re-
solve the dispute from her pre-existing state of belief. In hard
cases, however, the parties' conflicting positions cannot be re-
solved by the current legal norms, and the judge is put into a
state of doubt. The judge has to resolve this state of doubt by dis-
cerning a set of coherent legal norms that can resolve the dispute.
To resolve the state of doubt, Peirce proposed a scientific
method of adjudicating opinions which he called pragmatism.6"
This scientific method of doubt reduction depends upon a par-
63. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 70 (1967) (describing Peirce as "the founder
of pragmatism"). See generally JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LIFE (1993).
64. See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, The Fixation of Belief, in CHARLES S. PEIRCE: SELECTED
WRITINGS (VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE) 98-99 (P. Wiener ed., 1958).
65. See id. at 100.
66. See id. at 99-100.
67. See id. at 100.
68. See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in CHARLES S. PEIRCE: SELECTED
WRITINGS (VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE) 183 (P. Wiener ed., 1958) [hereinafter
PEIRCE, Pragmatism]. Peirce's pragmatism was originally announced in the form of a
maxim: "consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object." CHARLES S. PEIRCE, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in
CHARLES S. PEIRCE: SELECTED WRITINGS (VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE) 124 (P.
Wiener ed., 1958).
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ticular understanding of the meaning of propositions. Rather
than determining the meaning of propositions based on some ab-
stract meaning of terms and logical connection among them,
pragmatism defines the meaning of a proposition by the effects or
practical bearing that that proposition has for your conduct.69 The
effects are conceived exclusively in terms of their sensible affects
on the senses. Pragmatism then experimentally tests the conse-
quences of the conflicting beliefs against experience to ascertain
the "one true conclusion"" and achieve doubt reduction. The
method of pragmatism results in agreement as to the superior
course of action. This agreement is not just a matter of agreement
with an individual's mind. Like a scientific experiment, Peirce
claims that in principle, anyone who followed the method of
pragmatism would come to the same "one true conclusion" about
the propositions in question. The state of belief is, Peirce main-
tains, the same for all of us. Consequently, in hard cases, judges
would be required to scientifically test the consequences of alter-
native legal norms to resolve the doubt by determining the "one
true conclusion" to the dispute. The method of pragmatism would
thus resolve the hard case and bring the law back into a state of
belief.
Peirce's pragmatism, however, appears foreign to the method
employed by the hunch theory of judicial decision making. Al-
though the courtroom is a conflict between two different opinions,
Hutcheson does not describe the judge's task as an empirical ex-
periment to test the different effects of the solutions offered by
the litigants. According to Hutcheson, the brooding mind creates
and changes jural relations, but this is not accomplished by de-
veloping propositions that are then scientifically tested. The
bridging function of the hunch is an imaginative act like an art-
ist, not an experiment like a scientist. Further, the hunch does
not seem limited to the ordinary sensory awareness. The judge, in
some sense, engages her imagination to rise above the "con-
stricting matter whether of confused fact or precedent"7 to feel
the just decision. This process of feeling the just result seems for-
eign to the rational scientific process of analyzing the empirical
effects of different legal norms. Finally, the judge is not attempt-
69. See PEIRCE, Pragmatism, supra note 68, at 192.
70. Id. at 108.
71. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34 (1938).
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ing to determine which litigant proposes the best logical solution
to the dispute. Recall that Hutcheson rejected "logomancy" and
any emphasis on the logical or conceptual resolution of legal dis-
putes. 2 The hunch, not logical analysis, leads to and confirms the
judge's decision. Consequently, even this cursory analysis of
Peirce's pragmatism seems to indicate that it cannot justify the
hunch theory.
2. William James
Conversely, the hunch theory seems closer to James's pragma-
tism, which is psychological rather than logical. Rather than
Peirce's method of testing the meaning of propositions by their
logical and experimentally verifiable consequences, James tested
the meaning of propositions against their "immediately felt sen-
sations or personal reactions." 3 This psychological focus immedi-
ately seems quite similar to Hutcheson's emphasis on the felt
sensation of the hunch. The purpose of this section is to demon-
strate the similarities in Hutcheson's and James's thinking and
to provide a pragmatic epistemological justification for Hutche-
son's hunch theory of judicial decision making.
Before considering the philosophical similarities, there is some
historical and textual support for a pragmatic epistemological
justification of the hunch. First, James's theory of pragmatism
was surely part of the philosophical context within which
Hutcheson wrote. James published the seeds of his theory, The
Sentiment of Rationality,74 in 1879, long before Hutcheson's arti-
cle, The Judgment Intuitive, which was published in 1929."5 Fur-
ther, James's more mature theory of pragmatism was outlined in
a public lecture and published in 1907.76 In addition, Hutcheson
was clearly aware of James's work. He cited to James in The
Judgment Intuitive for the proposition that "'when the conclusion
is there, we have always forgotten most of the steps preceding its
72. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
73. PEIRCE, Pragmatism, supra note 68, at 181 (editor's introduction).
74. WILLIAAI JAMES, The Sentiment of Rationality, in ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 3 (1948)
[hereinafter JAIES, Sentiment of Rationality].
75. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, reprinted in JOSEPI C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMIENT INTUTIE 14 (1938).
76. See WILLIAM JAiES, PRAGMATISM (1907).
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attainment."'77 Thus, even though my argument is primarily
philosophical, these historical and textual factors suggest that
Hutcheson may have been directly influenced by James's pragma-
tism. In that case, the following could be looked at either as an
attempt to draw out Hutcheson's unarticulated pragmatic epis-
temological presuppositions or as an attempt to show that
James's pragmatic epistemological presuppositions justify the
hunch theory of judicial decision making.
James's cosmological theory of experience claims that our di-
rect particular experience includes the conjunctive and disjunc-
tive relations between things as well as the things themselves.
The "parts of experience" are held together "by relations that are
themselves part of experience."" In other words, no "trans-
empirical connective support" holds the universe together."0
James refers to this inclusive view of experience as the vast
wholeness of experience or the fullness of experience.8 ' Also,
pragmatism includes abstractions or theories in this wholeness of
experience.8 2 "Her only test of probable truth," according to
James, "is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits
every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of expe-
rience's demands, nothing being omitted." 3 Pragmatism, then,
takes both logic (or theory) and the external senses as valid expe-
riences. Rationalism limits itself to logic (theory), and empiricism
77. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 282, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 27 (1938) (quoting 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY 260 (Alice H. James, 1918) (1890)).
78. WILLIAM JAMES, The Meaning of Truth, in PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 133,
138 (1963) [hereinafter JAMES, Meaning of Truth]. James also commented that: "Realities
mean, then either concrete facts, or abstract kinds of thing[s] and relations perceived in-
tuitively between them. They furthermore and thirdly mean, as things that new ideas of
ours must no less take account of, the whole body of other truths already in our posses-
sion." WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, in ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 159,
165-66 (1948) [hereinafter JAMES, Conception of Truth].
79. JAMES, Meaning of Truth, supra note 78, at 138.
80. Id.
81. James claimed that: "Your acquaintance with reality grows literally by buds or
drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection you can divide these into components,
but as immediately given, they come totally or not at all." ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD,
PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY 68 n.4 (David Ray Griffin & Donald W.
Sherburne eds., corrected ed. 1978) [hereinafter WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY]
(quoting WILLIAM JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ch. VII (Frederick H. Burk-
hardt et al. eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1979) (1911)).
82. WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 141, 154
(1948) [hereinafter JAMES, Pragmatism].
83. Id. at 157.
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limits itself to the external senses. James's pragmatic empiricism,
however, includes all experience-physical and mental. James
gave his pragmatic empiricism the name "radical empiricism."s'
With the complexity of experience in radical empiricism, how
does one make a practical decision about what the future will be-
come? James says that we will recognize answers to practical
problems as we do everything else, "by certain subjective
marks.""5 These subjective marks include "a strong feeling of
ease, peace, rest" and a transition from a puzzled or perplexed
state to a state of rational comprehension. 6 James calls these
subjective marks the "Sentiment of Rationality."" He argues that
we experience the justification of the decision and feel a lack of
the need to justify or explain it, which he alternatively calls a
feeling of the lack of irrationality.8
The Sentiment of Rationality means that the decision agrees
with our mind or fits with our past beliefs and anticipation of the
future consequences. As with Hutcheson's hunch, this agreement
with the mind performs a leading and confirming function.
Agreement, in its broadest sense, means to guide you to the point
where the relations between things (ideas and external sense ex-
perience) can be felt. 9 Since it produces this easy feeling of ra-
tionality, however, agreement also means a confirmation or that
there is agreement with that person's mind. Thus, the Sentiment
of Rationality, like the hunch, is a sign that the decision fits with
the past (facts of the case, precedents, statutes) and the future.
James, like Hutcheson, criticized rationalistic explanations of
decision making. He argues that concepts do not provide "magic
words" or "solving names" which solve disputes." "Theories thus
84. JAMES, Meaning of Truth, supra note 78, at 138; WILLIAM JAMES, The Will to Be-
lieve, in PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 185, 187 (1963).
85. JAMES, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. James defines the Sentiment of Rationality as a "feeling of the sufficiency of
the present moment... [the] absence of all need to explain it, account for it, or justify it."
Id.
89. James stated that: '[t]o 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to
be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working
touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we dis-
agreed." JAMES, Conception of Truth, supra note 78, at 166.
90. JAAES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 145; cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLuAi. L. REv. 809, 820 (1935) ("So too are
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become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can
rest."9 Ideas, including legal concepts and decisions, become true
if they help make a satisfactory relationship to other parts of our
experience. 92 For an idea to be "true" means that it performs a
marriage process-the new belief melds with our existing true
(melded) beliefs-and that it produces the sentiment of rational-
ity. Truth, according to James, happens to an idea. It is made
true by its agreement with your mind. Consequently, for new
theories or ideas to work, they "must mediate between all previ-
ous truths and certain new experiences" and produce the subjec-
tive marks of ease, peace, and rest (i.e., the Sentiment of Ration-
ality).93
Likewise, Hutcheson says that jural relations are created and
constantly changed by the power of the brooding mind.9 The ac-
tive, subjective process of brooding and hunching creates bridges
for the judicial mind. Hutcheson goes so far as to argue that the
best chance for justice comes from the hunch.95 Truth, in James's
sense, could be inserted for justice in the preceding sentence. The
best chance for justice or truth comes from the hunch or senti-
ment of rationality because this method makes a decision based
on the wholeness of experience. Ratiocination reduces experience
to try to fit it into predetermined categories. The fullness of the
felt relationships in and between the facts of the case and the le-
gal precedent are lost. This seems to be the "hidden truth" that is
felt by the judge. Thus, Hutcheson seems to agree with James
that true decisions are most likely to result when the fullness of
experience, espoused by the doctrine of radical empiricism, is
taken into account by the method of pragmatism (hunching).
In their pragmatic methods of decision making, both Hutche-
son and James indicate a "brooding" or perplexity from which the
hunch or sentiment of rationality arises to marry the past and the
title, contract, conspiracy, malice, proximate cause, and all the rest of the magic 'solving
words' of traditional jurisprudence.").
91. JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 145.
92. See id. at 147.
93. Id. at 167.
94. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 276, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 17-18 (1938).
95. Id. at 280, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 24
(1938).
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future." According to Hutcheson (and James), the judge (practical
decision maker) must consider all the evidence, precedent, and
her life experience as relevant to the decision making process."
She then tries to connect the past with the future. Once the judge
achieves the sentiment of rationality or hunch as to a decision,
then that decision agrees with her mind. She must then have
faith in that sentiment of rationality or hunch and act upon it.
Further, the laws or truths created by this process are tentative.
Future decisions cannot be made simply by classifying novelty
within past structures. Each decision requires a reassessment of
old truths; each decision redefines the truth.
Finally, Hutcheson and James also both emphasize that cogni-
tion of the steps in reaching the conclusion is unimportant.
Hutcheson even cites James in The Judgment Intuitive for the
proposition that '.[w]hen the conclusion is there we have already
forgotten most of the steps preceding its attainment."'' 8 According
to James, cognition is but a "fleeting moment."99 Its chief purpose
is to guide action rather than provide philosophical insight. This
description of cognition coincides with Hutcheson's comments
that often the best judges, who decide by hunching, are unable to
rationalize their decisions adequately.' Also, Hutcheson argues,
and James would agree, that judicial opinions are just a ration-
alization of the experiential basis of the judge's decision.'0 ' Thus,
for both James and Hutcheson, the practical person (judge) takes
life in its concrete fullness to feel a course of action, without nec-
essarily being able to explain its relation to the whole of experi-
ence.
96. Id. at 282, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 27
(1938) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 59, 60 (1928));
JAMES, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 13.
97. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 285, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTurIvE 14, 30 (1938); see JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 145.
98. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 282, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 27 (1938) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE 61 n.155 (1928)).
99. JAMES, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 18.
100. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 287, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTuITIVE 14, 33 (1938).
101. Id. at 285, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT IJITIVE 14, 30
(1938).
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IV. PRAGMATIC CONDITIONS OF WARRANTED BELIEF
The preceding discussion has attempted to provide a pragmatic
justification for the hunch theory of judicial decision making. De-
spite this justification, a good pragmatist would still ask what
practical difference this pragmatic epistemological justification
makes. What is its cash-value for an account of when judges are
warranted in trusting their hunches? Without saying more, it
might seem as if Hutcheson and James are proposing that a deci-
sion is justified merely by a feeling that it is rational. This seems
to suggest a form of relativism where anything is permitted.
Judges would be warranted in relying on any old hunch no matter
how arbitrary it seems to others. This section, however, tries to
dispel these concerns by demonstrating that James's pragmatism
includes some pragmatic conditions that discipline the process of
decision making and that help save the judicial hunch from arbi-
trariness.
To fully understand James's radical proposal to practical deci-
sion making, the metaphysics of radical empiricism needs to be
further explored. First, it is essential to understand that James's
metaphysics radically rejects the subject/object split.' °2 Hilary
Putnam has noted that since Descartes, most philosophers have
argued that "in perception we receive 'impressions' that are im-
material, totally different-separated by a metaphysical gulf-in
fact from all the material objects we normally claim to perceive;
and from the character of our internal mental impressions we in-
fer how things are in the external physical world."' 3 In other
words, we first have consciousness of an impression of physical
objects and then somehow derive or postulate the physical world
we are "experiencing" from that impression. By contrast, James
argues that we actually experience the objects themselves as re-
lated to us in some way." Perception is direct or unmediated.
When I perceive your body, I do not perceive an impression of
your body that is mysteriously related to your actual body. I per-
ceive your actual body. Certainly, my conception of your body is
an abstraction from that perception, but James maintains that I
have a direct experience of your actual body prior to formulating
102. Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 153, 164 (1996).
103. Id. at 160.
104. Id. at 164.
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this conception.' ° Experience is prior to and more inclusive than
our consciousness of it. Furthermore, Hilary Putnam has charac-
terized James's thought as a form of "direct realism" or natural
realism.' Putnam further clarifies that James is claiming that
the properties and relations we experience are the stuff of the uni-
verse; there is no non-experiential "substratum"... and these experi-
enced or experienceable properties and relations (James is unfortu-
nately a little vague at this crucial point) make up both minds and
material obj ects. Moreover, minds and material objects, in a sense
"overlap."
109
In other words, James argues that we have access to a common
world via our experience. The properties and relations that seem
to make up material objects are also part of our minds. We are
related to material objects and a common world not separated
from them by a mysterious and unbridgeable metaphysical gulf.
In this respect, Alfred North Whitehead has argued that the
apprehension of a vague and inarticulate causation is primary
while consciousness is secondary.0° In other words, what we are
conscious of is a reduction of that vague sense of causation. James
seems to agree with Whitehead, or more likely Whitehead agrees
with James, by claiming that the wholeness of experience is pri-
mary and our conscious beliefs secondary. °9 James indicates this
by arguing that an idea is true if it agrees with your mind." ° This
agreement is not a conscious idea but the sentiment of rational-
ity. Likewise, Hutcheson advocates the hunch, a subjective sign,
as the best bet for a just decision."' For Hutcheson and James,
rational precepts constrain our experience of that vague and inar-
ticulate wholeness of experience. Thus, hunching is the best way
to make practical decisions because it takes into account the full-
ness of experience and not just a selective part of it.
James's rejection of the subject/object distinction further means
that even though he is defining practical deliberation subjec-
105. Id. at 165.
106. Id. at 164.
107. Id. at 165.
108. See WHrEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 81, at 173, 178.
109. See JAMES, Conception of Truth, supra note 78, at 161-64.
110. Id.
111. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 280, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HuTcHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 24 (1938).
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tively, he is not claiming that it is merely subjective. Since our
minds "overlap" with a common world, subjectivity is not isolated
from the world. It is primarily related to it and has a direct expe-
rience of it. In the wholeness of experience, the mind (subject) and
the world (object) are one. Further, James rejects the idea that
there is an objective truth, like economic analysis, that can re-
solve practical problems." 2 Our truths are subjectively defined,
and he refers to pragmatism as a subjective method of determin-
ing the truth.
13
Consequently, applying James's pragmatic epistemology to
judging means that the process of judging must be looked at from
the inside. Judging is not about how an objective truth or an ab-
stract legal principle can resolve the case at hand. James recog-
nizes that "[a]bstract rules indeed can help," but he claims that
"they help the less in proportion as our intuitions are more
piercing."" 4 Hence, judging is about the judge taking in all the
relevant legal materials, factual information, and other factors
and trying to determine the outcome. Once the judge has come to
a resolution of the case, the judge should have a sentiment of ra-
tionality or hunch that her decision makes sense. This subjective
sign is not an "objective justification" of the judge's conclusion.
Rather, it is a confirmation that the judge's decision resonates
with what the judge believes is true about the law, the facts, and
how they should relate. If a judge does not have a sentiment of
rationality, this should be a sign that the judge's decision is ill-
formed. As a result, the first disciplining pragmatic condition of
this approach is that the judge must be relying on a hunch or sen-
timent of rationality for the decision to be justifiable.
Under this first pragmatic condition, James and Hutcheson are
saying that the hunch is essential to signaling a subjective clo-
sure to the judge's deliberation. Without the hunch, the judge is
not subjectively resolved about the best outcome. Although James
has more to say about the nature of the best outcome that we
ought to seek,"' here he is concerned with the subjective process
112. See JAMES, Conception of Truth, supra note 78, at 161-64.
113. Id.
114. WILLIAM JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in ESSAYS IN
PRAGMATISM 65, 83 (1948) [hereinafter JAMES, Moral Philosopher].
115. James argues that there is no final static good state we should try to achieve.
Rather, he claims that "the guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands
conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as many
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of belief formation and what makes a belief one that we are war-
ranted in relying on. He argues for "personal belief as one of the
ultimate conditions of truth. For again and again success depends
on energy of act; energy again depends on faith that we shall not
fail; and that faith in turn on the faith that we are right-which
faith thus verifies itself."" 6 In other words, a subjective belief
that we are right (signaled by a hunch) is a precondition to justi-
fying one's decision. Initially, this appears to have little or no dis-
ciplining effect on judges. Upon further reflection, however, this
is not a trivial condition of action. It requires judges to search le-
gal precedent, deposition and trial transcripts, and whatever else
is required until the judge feels subjectively justified in her deci-
sion. For example, consider the situation where the defendant has
a good technical legal argument and the plaintiff has a good fac-
tual argument but a less persuasive interpretation of the relevant
law. Accepting the defendant's argument may allow the judge to
be subjectively resolved about the law but not about the facts.
Conversely, accepting the plaintiffs argument may allow the
judge to be subjectively resolved about the facts but not necessar-
ily about the law. For James and Hutcheson, the judge cannot
choose either of these options. The judge must be resolved subjec-
tively about the whole case. The judge must study the case again
and again until she finds an interpretation of the law and the
facts that allows her to have a subjective belief in the rightness of
her decision about the whole case. Uneasiness about the result
means that the decision is not warranted. In other words, the
judge must do the best she can to resolve all the loose ends in the
case and come to a decision that she feels confident is right. The
judge knows that this has occurred when she feels a flash of in-
sight or sentiment of rationality about her decision.
demands as we can." Id. at 80. In other words,
[t]hat act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best whole,
in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions. In the casuistic
scale, therefore, those ideals must be written highest which prevail at the
least cost, or by whose realization the least possible number of other ideals
are destroyed.
Id. He further claims that "ethical science is just like physical science, and instead
of being deducible all at once from abstract principles, must simply bide its time,
and be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day." Id. at 82. In other words, he
proposes a casuistic process of paying attention to the concrete and making norma-
tive judgments about what ought to be in terms of a continual process of struggling
"&from generation to generation to find the more and more inclusive order." Id. at 80.
He asks us to "[i]nvent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also
satisfy the alien demands that and that only is the path of peace!" Id.
116. JAMEs, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 29.
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Further, James would argue that the sentiment of rationality
must be achieved with respect to the judge's decision in each case.
The reason for this is that "[f]or every real dilemma is in literal
strictness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals
realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is
always a universe without a precedent, and for which no ade-
quate previous rule exists.""7 Therefore, deciding cases on
hunches or the sentiment of rationality does not allow judges to
decide cases arbitrarily based on any hunch and has a disciplin-
ing effect in all cases, not just hard ones.
Once the judge has received a hunch or a sentiment of ration-
ality, this is not the end of the story. James argues that we must
use the pragmatic method to test these decisions in accordance
with their consequences."' The second disciplining pragmatic
condition, which is absent from Hutcheson's account, is thus the
pragmatic testing of the judge's decision. Subsequent to the first
pragmatic condition of coming to a subjective hunch, the judge
should test her decision based on its consequences. In other
words, despite James's confidence that we all experience a com-
mon world and have access to a common truth, he is not naive
about the possibility of disagreement about our interpretations of
that world." 9 He recognizes that there is a plurality of decisions
that different decision makers may feel confident are right or
produce the sentiment of rationality. Hence, James argues that
we must test these judgments by their fruits; "[t]he results of the
action corroborate or refute the idea from which it flowed." 2 ' The
verification of a theory or claim means
that if you proceed to act upon your theory it will be reversed by
nothing that later turns up as your action's fruit; it will harmonize so
well with the entire drift of experience that the latter will, as it were,
adopt it, or at most give it an ampler interpretation, without obliging
you in any way to change the essence of its formulation.
121
By contrast, if your decision is mistaken, James notes that
the course of experience will throw ever new impediments in the way
of my belief, and become more and more difficult to express in its
117. JAMES, Moral Philosopher, supra note 114, at 83.
118. JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 142.
119. JAMES, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 12.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id.
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language. Epicycle upon epicycle of subsidiary hypotheses will have
to be invoked to give to the discrepant terms a temporary appear-
ance of squaring with each other; but at last even this resource will
fail.
1 22
Consequently, to test their hunches judges must follow the conse-
quences of their decisions. They must test whether their subjec-
tive feeling of rightness has consequences that verify it.
This will be a change from judges' traditional orientation to-
ward legal doctrine to an orientation toward the effects of their
decision. In this respect, James emphasizes that the pragmatic
method entails "[tihe attitude of looking away from first things,
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking to-
wards last things, fruits, consequences, facts."'23 Justice is not
achieved by aiming at any fixed ideal of justice or legal principle
but by paying attention to the concrete actuality of the case and
deciding in a way that establishes the proper relationship be-
tween that case, prior precedent, and the future consequences of
the decision. Accordingly, if the judge's decision is based on the
sentiment of rationality, it is the best probable truth because it
"works best in the way of leading us" to a decision about "what
fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of
experience's demands.""2 This probable truth must then be tested
by its consequences. Judges must pay attention to what effects
their decisions have. They should discern whether the parties
were able to live up to the terms of the decision and stick to the
court's resolution of the case. Judges should also determine
whether other similarly situated parties changed their behavior
because of the decision. In other words, the court should deter-
mine whether the opinion furnished good or bad incentives for fu-
ture actors. The court should also look at the effect on other
courts. Has the force of this decision been verified or contradicted
by other courts? Judges already appear to do some of these
things. However, they often do not look at these things as tests of
the rightness of their decision. By contrast, James argues that
the merits of the decision are determined by the decision's conse-
quences. For example, if future cases demonstrate that justifying
the legal decision requires numerous "subsidiary hypotheses"
122. Id.
123. JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 146; cf. POSNER, supra note 5.
124. JAMES, Pragmatism, supra note 82, at 157.
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that eventually undermine the original decision, James would ar-
gue that the decision has been determined to be false or mis-
guided and ought to be corrected. 2 5 In other words, James insists
that the judicial hunch be subjected to the pragmatic method of
testing.'26 Hunches must be verified by their consequences for the
parties, future claimants, future precedent, etc.
Further, James is not saying that this verification will neces-
sarily occur within the "life of a single philosopher" or judge.'27 He
argues that "the experience of the entire human race must make
the verification, and that all the evidence will not be 'in' till the
final integration of things, when the last man has had his say and
contributed his share."2 ' For example, with respect to the moral
life, James claims that "[t]he course of history is nothing but the
story of men's struggles from generation to generation to find the
more and more inclusive order."'29 By following this path, he
maintains that society has attained "one sort of relative equilib-
rium after another by series of social discoveries quite analogous
to those of science." 3 ° For example, "[plolyandry and polygamy
and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial torture
and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to actually
aroused complaints."' 3 ' Consequently, the judge should strive to
test her decision against these social discoveries but also realize
that her decision is always provisional in that the future experi-
ence of the human race can later determine it null and void.
In sum, James's pragmatic epistemology provides two prag-
matic conditions to discipline judicial decision making. First, be-
fore a judicial decision is warranted, the judge must experience a
subjective sense of certainty about her decision (a sentiment of
rationality) after taking into consideration all the relevant facts
and the law. This subjective sense of certainty prevents judges
from prematurely resolving a case based on a partial under-
standing of it and requires that judges examine and account for
125. JAMES, Sentiment of Rationality, supra note 74, at 33.
126. See id. at 142, 157.
127. See id. at 34.
128. Id.
129. JAMES, Moral Philosopher, supra note 114, at 80.
130. Id.; cf JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 8 (1993) (arguing that his political
conception of justice can be tested against "considered convictions" to accomplish a state of
reflective equilibrium warranting that the political conception of justice be adopted).
131. JAMES, Moral Philosopher, supra note 114, at 80.
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all aspects of the case in their decision. If the judge cannot recon-
cile all these elements, the judge will not attain the sentiment of
rationality that is a prerequisite to a justified decision. Second,
James adds the pragmatic condition that judges' decisions must
be pragmatically tested to determine if their fruits verify the de-
cision. This test provides a manner in which bad hunches can be
weeded out. Even if the judge decided a case based on a legiti-
mate feeling of certainty, subsequent developments may indicate
that the judge's decision was unjust and that it should be over-
turned. Thus, although the hunch theory cannot provide the cer-
tainty of outcomes promised by strong legal formalism, it does,
with the help of James's pragmatic epistemology, include two
pragmatic conditions that discipline judges' hunching and that
increase the possibility of a just result.
V. DISTINGUISHING HUTCHESON FROM THE LEGAL REALISTS
Basing the hunch theory on James's pragmatism means that
Hutcheson can be classified as a realist in the philosophical
sense."2 As indicated above, James proposed a direct realism
which is a form of philosophical realism.'33 The following will ar-
gue, however, that the philosophical realism of the hunch theory
is contrary to the epistemological basis of legal realism. Conse-
quently, this section challenges the traditional classification of
Hutcheson as a legal realist.
Traditionally, Hutcheson's hunch theory of judicial decision
making has been classified as part of the legal realist movement
in the United States.'34 Both Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank,
probably the two leading legal realists, referred to Hutcheson as a
realist. 35 Most interpreters of legal realism have also considered
132. By realism, I mean someone who believes that the experience of vague and inar-
ticulate causation (the wholeness of experience) is primary and that consciousness is sec-
ondary. Conversely, an idealist thinks that "apart from concepts there is nothing to know"
and that "the objective world [is] a construct from subjective experience." WHITEHEAD,
PROCESS AND REALITY, supra note 81, at 156. In other words, consciousness is primary
and causation is derived from it. Kant is an example of an idealist, while Hutcheson,
James, and Whitehead are realists. See supra text accompanying notes 116-122.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-113.
134. See supra note 14.
135. See FRANK, supra note 14, at 6; Llewellyn, Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at
603-04; Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 14, at 1258.
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Hutcheson a realist."6 This raises the question of what it means
to be a legal realist.
Llewellyn made several attempts to identify some of the key le-
gal realists and to define the ideas associated with them."7 In
Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,'38 however, William
Twining criticized Llewellyn's attempt to define legal realism as a
legal theory. 9 He argued that legal realism can be better under-
stood as a historical phenomenon and only as a "discrete phe-
nomenon" until 1928.140 These criticisms have some validity when
the differences between Llewellyn, the scientific realists, and the
policy realists are identified. Conversely, to call something a his-
torical phenomenon means that it has characteristics which dis-
tinguish it from other historical phenomena. Thus, Llewellyn's at-
tempts to define the characteristics of legal realism can be helpful
to determine whether Hutcheson was part of the historical phe-
nomenon called legal realism.
Llewellyn identified nine "common points of departure" for le-
gal realists.' 4' Hutcheson exhibits at least three of these charac-
teristics. First, as most realists believe, the hunch theory of judi-
cial decision making views law as changing and tentative. Law is
a "thing of life," and the judge is its creator. Second, Hutcheson
refers to a common realist claim that judicial opinions are a ra-
tionalization of a decision made on other grounds. Hutcheson
stated that decisions are based on hunches or intuition and that
"the ratiocination appears only in the opinion."' The judge works
backward from her hunch using a stock of logical premises to jus-
tify the result. Finally, as other legal realists, Hutcheson pro-
moted reform in law schools. He called for a "change in the meth-
ods of study and of the teaching of the law in our great law
schools" to eliminate the misconception that judicial decision
136. See White, Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 14 at 1016.
137. See Llewellyn, Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 587-614; Llewellyn, Some
Realism, supra note 14, at 1235-56.
138. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1985).
139. Id. at 74-83.
140. Id. at 82.
141. See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 14, at 1235-56.
142. See Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 285, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 30 (1938) (stating that the -intuitive sense' is the grounds
upon which judicial decisions are made").
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making is logical and to produce better judges and lawyers.
Despite the concordance between these legal realist points of
departure and the hunch theory, the hunch theory differs sub-
stantially from the views espoused by Llewellyn, the scientific re-
alists, and the policy realists. First, although Llewellyn recog-
nized a role for intuition and the pragmatic testing of the social
and political effects of judges' decisions, he espoused a much more
scientific understanding of legal adjudication than Hutcheson.'
For instance, Llewellyn argued that "[r]ealism is not a philoso-
phy, but a technology."' By a technology, he means a method
which can be used in the service of any end. He claims that the
method is to check accepted doctrine against its results.'46 Ini-
tially, this seems similar to James's pragmatic method of testing
the consequences of decisions, but Llewellyn approaches this
question from an "empirical perspective" which is based on a soci-
ology of law.' By this, Llewellyn
mean[s] not just that the operative legal rules can actually be found
in law books, but the content which the doctrines say these rules pos-
sess is drawn in the first instance from observation of actual decision
making, rather than from how legal scholars respond to the words of
the rule.
148
In other words, he maintains that there must be an empirical
analysis of actual cases to determine "that court decisions in fact
follow the stated rule, that the rule is thus sociologically valid."49
His own attempt to do this, in On Warranty of Quality and Soci-
ety, 50 is a long and tedious historical analysis of warranty cases,
of the particular judges involved, and the policy that develops.
Likewise, Llewellyn views the judge as someone who has experi-
143. Id. at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTcHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34
(1938).
144. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 78-81, 89-95 (Paul Ge-
wirth ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM].
145. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CoWMON LAW TRADITION 510 (1960) [hereinafter
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW]; see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 9-10
(1930) (arguing that legal realism "was and still is an effort at more effective legal tech-
nology").
146. Llewellyn, Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 587.
147. LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 144, at 90.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699
(1936); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341
(1937).
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ence in a particular area, like one of his case law studies. Based
on this specialized knowledge of the case law, Llewellyn argues
that there is a distinct judicial ability to make decisions by some-
thing like the specialized horse sense of the horse trader; "the
balanced shrewdness of the expert in the art."'5 '
Conversely, Hutcheson argues that the judge needs to utilize
her imagination to lift "the mind above the mass of constricting
matter whether of confused fact or precedent that stands in the
way of a just decision."152 The kind of scientific examination of
precedent followed by Llewellyn seems alien to Hutcheson.
Imagination tries to grasp the wholeness of experience and the
relationships between all that the judge has considered. A scien-
tific examination of precedent is not part of the process of
hunching.
The underlying difference between Llewellyn and Hutcheson is
hidden by Llewellyn's failure to indicate that form can limit sub-
stance. In other words, the method of realism can limit one's
philosophical assumptions. For example, the method of realism
advocates a separation of is from ought'53 for description, observa-
tion, and establishing relations between the things described.'54
To be able to describe, observe, and establish relations, we must
limit our inquiry to conscious experience. As a result, Llewellyn's
empiricism is much more limited than Hutcheson. This becomes
very evident in Llewellyn's interpretation of the hunch theory as
merely marking out what the judge's limitations are and how
judges can at times come close "to being controlled by [the] prece-
dent."' Llewellyn appears to be imposing a limited form of em-
piricism on the hunch theory. If judges are not conscious of the
basis of their decision, then they are not really deciding the case
in a manner that the legal realists would understand. A legal re-
alist decision is informed by description, observation, and estab-
lishing conscious relations between things. Hutcheson, however,
advocates making judicial decisions based on the hunching from
151. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 145, at 121.
152. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTcHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34 (1938).
153. A pragmatic consideration of the fullness of experience would not even be able to
make the fact/value distinction in the decision making process.
154. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 14, at 1236-37.
155. Llewellyn, Newer Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 604.
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the fullness of experience.'56 Hutcheson even admits that we often
forget most of the steps to the conclusion by the time we get
there.'57 In essence, the method of legal realism eliminates the
fullness of experience which Hutcheson advocated as the best way
to ensure a just decision. Thus, the limitation of Llewellyn's for-
mal method on the substance of experience countable in a legal
realist decision is radically different from the hunch theory.
Hutcheson can also be distinguished from the scientific realists
in that his description of the hunch seems to go beyond ordinary
sense experience which is the basis for their decisions. 58 For ex-
ample, the judge seeking justice according to the hunch method
would not decide a parking ticket dispute on the basis of empiri-
cal studies of parking done in New Haven, Connecticut. 19 She
would try to feel the relations between the parties, the situation,
the community, and the law. The hunch method would not want
to limit the fullness of experience to this scientific data because
the violator could be a statistical aberrant.
Further, unlike the noted legal realist Jerome Frank, Hutche-
son does not indicate that judges' hunches can be scientifically
explained. 60 Frank talks about the hunch theory as if, through
psychoanalysis of judges, we could, in principle, determine the
"hunch-producers." 6' Frank, then, does not interpret the hunch
theory as advocating that judges decide cases based on the full-
ness of experience or radical empiricism. He interprets it as ex-
plaining how judges' biases determine their decisions.'62 From
Frank's and Llewellyn's interpretation of Hutcheson and legal re-
alism, it is evident that legal realism has a narrow view of expe-
rience. The narrow scientific experience allowed by the method of
legal realism is alien to the fullness of experience in the hunch
156. See Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMENT INTurvE 14, 34 (1938).
157. See id. at 287, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITvE 14,
33 (1938).
158. See id. at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14,
34 (1938).
159. For the parking studies as an example of the scientific realists, see Underhill
Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53
YALE L.J. 11 (1943).
160. See Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON,
JR., JUDGMiENT INTUIVE 14, 34 (1938).
161. FRANK, supra note 14, at 111-15.
162 See id.
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theory. Thus, Hutcheson should not be labeled a legal realist but
as a pragmatist and radical empiricist.
VI. CONCLUSION
The explosion of fact and the indeterminacy of law have not
eliminated the possibility of justice. Hutcheson's hunch theory of
judicial decision making provides a pragmatic and empirical solu-
tion to these current dilemmas in a way that has not been fully
appreciated. Initially, the hunch theory seems to suggest that
judges can arbitrarily decide cases based on a subjective feeling.
Further analysis indicates, however, that hunching is warranted
given a pragmatic epistemological justification. William James's
pragmatic epistemology saves the hunch theory from arbitrari-
ness by positing a compelling case for direct realism and by pro-
viding two pragmatic conditions that help discipline judicial
hunching. These two pragmatic conditions require that judges
base their decisions on a subjective sense of certainty or a senti-
ment of rationality and that they pragmatically test their deci-
sions to verify them by their consequences. Furthermore, this
pragmatic justification demonstrates that Hutcheson embraced a
form of radical empiricism which is foreign to the narrow scien-
tific view of experience embraced by legal realists. Thus, Hutche-
son should no longer be considered a legal realist even though he
agrees with some aspects of legal realism.
Given this pragmatic epistemological justification of the hunch
theory, judges are warranted in adopting this method to tackle
the factual and legal complexity of our times. Judges should be
taught that judging is not a matter of deductive logic as advo-
cated by strong legal formalists or technical reasoning as advo-
cated by law and economics. Rather, the best way of determining
the just result is for judges to consider all the relevant facts and
legal precedent and to wait for a hunch or a "jump-spark connec-
tion between the question and decision."'63 In other words, judges
should expose their minds to the full complexity of their cases and
use their intuition or imagination to determine just decisions. As
163. Judgment Intuitive, supra note 9, at 278, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.,
JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 21 (1938).
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long as judges honor the pragmatic conditions which discipline
hunches, this method of judicial decision making has the poten-
tial of improving the administration of justice despite the explo-
sion of fact and the indeterminacy of law. Furthermore, the
hunch theory may finally lead to the "change in the methods of
study and of the teaching of the law in our great law schools""6'
that Hutcheson advocated over seventy years ago.
164. Id. at 288, reprinted in JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14, 34
(1938).
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